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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, ARE YOU A “CITIZEN”?: GARCETTI 
v. CEBALLOS AND THE “CITIZENSHIP” PRONG TO THE 
PICKERING/CONNICK PROTECTED SPEECH TEST 
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of 
free communication among the people thereon . . . has ever been justly 
deemed . . . the only effectual guardian of every other right.”1  James 
Madison’s famous words of protest to the Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrate 
the vital importance that the right to free speech holds in a democracy.2  This 
bedrock principle is recognized in the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.3  The core value of the First Amendment is to allow for 
“unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”4  As such, a democracy 
requires that those with well-informed knowledge of the inner workings of the 
government be able to engage in a meaningful civil dialogue.5  However, the 
right to free speech has never been held to be absolute.6 
 
 1. JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, PRONOUNCING THE ALIEN & 
SEDITION LAWS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF THE STATES 
(Washington, Jonathan Elliot 1839) (1798). 
 2. See Melissa Lierly, Note, “Say What?!?:” Defining Free Speech Protection for Public 
Employees: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. SPECIAL SUPP. 53, 61 (2006) (“[T]he 
First Amendment was fashioned for the exchange of ‘ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957))). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 4. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). 
 5. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958–59 (2006) (“The 
Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-
informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion . . . . The Court’s 
approach acknowledged the necessity for informed, vibrant dialogue in a democratic society.”). 
 6. E.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that child pornography receives no First Amendment protection if 
the applicable statute banning child pornography explicitly restricts works that visually portray 
children in a sexually explicit manner); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
(permitting a state to “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . . 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action”). 
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One such limitation is the government’s ability, acting as employer, to 
limit the free speech rights of its employees.7  For many years, “the 
unchallenged dogma was that a public employee,” like employees of private 
companies, “had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of 
employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional 
rights.”8  While this dogma has been qualified in many important respects,9 a 
state or federal governmental agency as an employer is still afforded a greater 
ability to restrict the free speech rights of its employees than it is permitted as a 
sovereign in restricting the speech of the citizenry as a whole.10  The 
government, as a sovereign, cannot restrict the free speech rights of the 
citizenry in the name of efficiency.11  However, the government, as employer, 
may be able to confine the free speech rights of its employees in order to 
function effectually.12  Although a government employee is best situated to 
comment on governmental actions, such a limitation is justified by the need to 
reconcile the rights of the government, as employer, to provide public services 
with the free speech rights of the employee.13 
The issue thus becomes where and how best to strike the balance between 
these competing concerns.14  As such, the Court has conventionally granted 
First Amendment protection to public employees only where they speak on a 
matter of public concern and their interest in promulgating the speech 
outweighs the disruption it causes the government in operating effectively.15  
The Supreme Court recently revised this analysis in Garcetti v. Ceballos by 
adopting a threshold per se rule that “when public employees make statements 
 
 7. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1957. 
 8. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). 
 9. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1957 (“The Court has made clear that 
public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their 
employment.  Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain 
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (recognizing 
that “the government as employer . . . has far broader powers than does the government as 
sovereign”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“[T]he State has interests as an 
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses 
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”). 
 11. Waters, 511 U.S. at 675. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (“The Court’s decisions, then, have 
sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak 
as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers 
attempting to perform their important public functions.”). 
 14. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”). 
 15. Waters, 511 U.S. at 668. 
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pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”16  In other words, a government 
employee is not entitled to this balancing test where they are speaking pursuant 
to their job function. 
This new bright line rule, attempting to simplify the inherent controversy 
between these competing policy concerns, tries to promote government 
efficiency by attempting to limit litigation of personnel grievances as 
constitutional claims.17  However, in the first year and half since its 
promulgation, the Garcetti rule has proven itself to be largely ineffective in 
achieving this goal.  This ineffectiveness demonstrates that any perceived 
benefit to the per se rule is substantially outweighed by adverse policy 
concerns.  First, Garcetti is not supported by the Court’s precedent, and the 
concern for government efficiency was adequately protected by the existing 
balancing test.  Second, the test will have a profound litigious effect on the 
courts by placing them in the new, permanent, and intrusive position of trying 
to apply this per se rule that has little history or direction to a wide variety of 
fact situations in determining what is part of an employee’s job function.  
Garcetti also places public employees in the unreasonable position of trying to 
determine when they are allowed to speak out on instances of government 
misconduct, thus limiting their willingness to do so and restricting the flow of 
information to the electorate.  Finally, the Court created a dangerous precedent 
in attempting to quell these concerns by justifying the limitation of a 
constitutional protection by saying that it is not needed because it is duplicative 
of state and federal procedural protection provided in whistleblower statutes.18 
This Note begins by discussing the history of the free speech protection 
afforded to government employees, namely the Pickering/Connick balancing 
test and the variety of ways the circuit courts of appeals have attempted to 
address this issue in the context of employees speaking pursuant to their job 
function.  After summarizing the Court’s holding and dissents, this Note 
discusses how Garcetti adds a new prong to the prima facie case for public 
employee First Amendment protection.  It then explains how the Court’s 
concerns for employer efficiency could have been adequately addressed by the 
pre-Garcetti balancing test.  The Note next discusses how any marginal benefit 
to government efficiency generated by this rule is substantially outweighed by 
the litigious effect this rule will have on the lower courts and the public policy 
 
 16. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 17. See id. at 1958 (noting that the Pickering inquiry has proven difficult to apply given the 
“enormous variety of fact situations” it has to tackle).  But see infra notes 200–04 and 
accompanying text (showing how the bright line rule merely shifts the focus of First Amendment 
retaliation litigation). 
 18. See infra Part VII. 
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concerns associated with limiting government employee free speech.  It 
concludes with a discussion of the inadequacy of whistleblower laws as a 
substitute for First Amendment protection. 
I.  THE ROAD TO GARCETTI: HISTORY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS 
A. Early History: Holmesian Logic 
The struggle to balance the speech rights of government employees with 
the rights of the government as employer is almost as old as the notion of free 
speech itself.  Immanuel Kant said that “[t]he public use of one’s reason must 
always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”19  
However Kant realized that speech had a public use, namely the “use which a 
person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public,” and a private use, 
namely “that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office 
which is entrusted to him.”20  Such private use of speech necessitates some 
limitations.21 
Early American case law was even more draconian toward the employee.  
In 1892, then-Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes held that employees could be 
required to relinquish their right to free speech by virtue of their employment.22  
In a famous quote, Holmes stated that a citizen “may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”23  
This unchallenged dogma survived well into the middle of the twentieth 
century in that courts still viewed public employment as a privilege that might 
necessitate limiting the employee’s right to free speech and assembly.24  
 
 19. IMMANUAL KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AND WHAT IS 
ENLIGHTENMENT 87 (Lewis White Beck trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id.  Kant explains: 
Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require a certain 
mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct 
themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public 
ends, or at least prevent them from destroying those ends.  Here argument is certainly not 
allowed—one must obey. 
Id. 
 22. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892) (“There are 
few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights 
of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.  The servant cannot 
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.”). 
 23. Id. at 517. 
 24. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952): 
If . . . a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified from employment in the public 
school system because of membership in a listed organization, he is not thereby denied 
the right of free speech and assembly.  His freedom of choice between membership in the 
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However in the 1960s, courts started to limit this Holmesian logic.25  The 
Supreme Court began to accept the premise that individuals should not be 
forced to relinquish all of their First Amendment rights by virtue of accepting 
public employment.26 
B. Pickering: A Balancing of Interests 
In 1968, the Supreme Court first articulated its balancing test for 
determining when employee speech is protected from retaliation under the 
First Amendment.27  In Pickering v. Board of Education, a teacher wrote a 
letter to a local newspaper criticizing the way in which the board of education 
and the superintendent of schools had handled past proposals to raise new 
revenue for the schools.28  After a hearing, the board of education determined 
that the publication of the letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools of the district” and that the interests of the school 
required the teacher’s dismissal.29  The Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the Illinois Supreme Court and held that the teacher’s dismissal was a violation 
of his First Amendment rights.30  The Court noted that “[t]he problem [here] is 
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”31 
 
organization and employment in the school system might be limited, but not his freedom 
of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every 
choice.  Certainly such limitation is not one the state may not make in the exercise of its 
police power to protect the schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own 
existence. 
 25. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) (O’Scannlain, J., specially 
concurring) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating state statutes 
denying public employment on the basis of membership in the Communist Party or other 
subversive political organizations); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) 
(invalidating state loyalty oath requiring state employees to deny membership in the Communist 
Party and to refuse to “lend aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party”)), 
rev’d, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 26. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (“Even 
though respondents work for the Government, they have not relinquished ‘the First Amendment 
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.’” (quoting 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))). 
 27. See Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 121, 123 (1996). 
 28. 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
 29. Id. at 564–65. 
 30. Id. at 565. 
 31. Id. at 568. 
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Thus, when a government employee challenges an adverse employment 
action on the basis of First Amendment retaliation, the employee is protected 
where they can show their interest in speech outweighs the disruption it causes 
the government in efficiently operating its offices.32  Upon applying these 
concerns to the facts of the case, the Court struck a balance in favor of the 
teacher, noting that there was an absence of proof of false statements 
knowingly or recklessly made by the teacher, and the speech did not interrupt 
the operations of the school.33  Since the disruption to the government was 
minimal, the teacher’s right to speak on issues of public importance could not 
lawfully furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.34 
A decade later, a unanimous Court held that the Pickering balancing rule 
applied to the “private expression” of a public employee as well as public 
expressions.35  In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, a 
schoolteacher was dismissed at the end of an academic year primarily because 
she criticized the racist policies and practices of her school and the school 
district.36  The Court found this to be a First Amendment violation despite the 
fact that the majority of her complaining was done in the form of “private 
encounters” with the school principal.37  The Supreme Court overruled the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision that such private expressions were not protected by the 
First Amendment.38  The Court explained that Pickering does not “support the 
conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental 
abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately 
rather than publicly.”39 
C. Connick: The Public Concern Threshold 
In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court revisited the situation of a public 
employee terminated for “speaking” out against her employer.40  Myers, an 
assistant district attorney responsible for trying criminal cases, was informed 
that she would be transferred to a different section of criminal court, which she 
strongly opposed.41  In response to a supervisor’s comments that her concerns 
about office morale “were not shared by others in the office,” Myers 
distributed a questionnaire “soliciting the views of her fellow staff members 
concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
 
 32. See Ma, supra note 27. 
 33. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979). 
 36. Id. at 411–13. 
 37. Id. at 412, 415–16. 
 38. Id. at 413. 
 39. Id. at 414. 
 40. 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983). 
 41. Id. 
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committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt 
pressured to work in political campaigns.”42  She was fired for insubordination 
and brought suit alleging that she was “wrongfully terminated because she had 
exercised her constitutionally protected right of free speech.”43  The Court held 
her termination did not violate her First Amendment rights since, with one 
exception, the survey did not address matters of public concern but rather 
addressed matters of private interest.44  As such, her questionnaire “touched 
upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense” and was better 
categorized as an employee grievance.45 
Some commentators have argued that this decision restricts access to free 
speech protection by adding a new threshold hurdle public employees must 
cross even before reaching the Pickering balancing test.46  Whether this is a 
new hurdle or just a clarification of Pickering, the Supreme Court made it clear 
in Connick that an employee is only entitled to the balancing test after they can 
demonstrate they spoke on a matter of public concern.47  If the employee is 
speaking solely on a matter of private interest, the employee is not entitled to 
the balancing test.48  The determination of whether speech is a matter of public 
concern or a matter of private interest requires courts to analyze its “content, 
form, and context.”49  Thus Pickering and Connick, read together, require a 
trial court presented with a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation 
claim to first “consider whether a public employee’s statement touches on a 
matter of public concern, and then the court must weigh the interests of the 
government, including preventing workplace disruption, against the 
employee’s interest in the speech.”50 
 
 42. Id. at 141. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 148. 
 45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. 
 46. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of 
Public Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 432 (1984); Ma, supra note 27, at 122. 
 47. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When employee expression cannot be fairly considered 
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government 
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 147–48. 
 50. Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a 
Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REV. 893, 898–99 (2005) (citing Connick, 461 
U.S. at 146; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); see also Waters v. Churchill, 
511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (plurality) (“To be protected, [an employee’s] speech must be on a 
matter of public concern, and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on this matter must not 
be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to ‘the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 142)). 
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D. The Pre-Garcetti Circuit Court Decisions: A “Speaking As a Citizen” 
Threshold? 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti, the circuit courts of 
appeals differed significantly on how much protection to afford public 
employees when they spoke out on matters of public concern related to their 
job function.  At least one circuit court of appeals, the Fourth Circuit, moved 
toward a rigid threshold analysis and per se rule that employee speech in the 
course of carrying out a job function is not protected speech.51  In Urofsky v. 
Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia law limiting public employees’ 
access to sexually explicit material on computers owned or leased by the state 
was consistent with the First Amendment.52  In conducting its analysis, the 
court concluded that, prior to applying the Pickering balancing test, the court 
must address the threshold inquiry of whether the law in question “regulates 
speech by state employees in their capacity as citizens upon matters of public 
concern.”53  In other words, the court must begin by deciding if the employee 
was speaking as a “private citizen” or as a “public employee.”54  If the speech 
regulated is that of state employees in their capacity as employees and not the 
citizenry in general, no First Amendment protection is available.55  The court 
thus concluded that since the university professors who challenged the act were 
not affected in their capacity as private citizens speaking on matters of public 
concern, there was no infringement of their First Amendment rights.56  While 
the facts of Urofsky bear significant differences from those in Garcetti,57 what 
is interesting about the Urofsky decision is that the Fourth Circuit perceives a 
“threshold” inquiry prior to the balancing test being applied.  Most other 
 
 51. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1177 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Only the Fourth 
Circuit seems to be moving toward a rule that public employees’ speech in the course of carrying 
out employment obligations is not protected under the First Amendment.”). 
 52. 216 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 53. Id. at 406 (emphasis added). 
 54. See id. at 407 (“Thus, critical to a determination of whether employee speech is entitled 
to First Amendment protection is whether the speech is made primarily in the [employee’s] role 
as citizen or primarily in his role as employee.” (internal quotation omitted)).   See also Zack, 
supra note 50, at 902, stating: 
In 2000, in Urofsky v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit held that in determining whether public 
employee speech receives First Amendment protection, a court first must consider 
whether the employee spoke as a private citizen or as a public employee; only after this 
consideration can a court determine whether the speech was of public concern under 
Connick and then move on to perform the Pickering v. Board of Education balancing test. 
 55. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409; see also Zack, supra note 50, at 895 (“In 2000, in Urofsky v. 
Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that if a public employee is performing 
regular workplace duties and thus acting as a representative of the state, the employee’s speech 
should not receive First Amendment protection.”). 
 56. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409. 
 57. See infra Part II.A. 
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circuits have not hinged their analysis on such a threshold inquiry.58  Other 
circuits that have held public employees’ speech pursuant to job-related duties 
did not involve matters of public concern ordinarily have done so not on such a 
threshold analysis, but rather “because the speech at issue primarily involved 
either personal grievances or the ‘routine discharge of assigned functions, 
where there is no suggestion of public motivation.’”59  As seen above in 
Connick, if the speech in question is related solely to a particular individual 
and is better categorized as a personal grievance, it is not protected.60  Some 
circuits applied this logic to speech that was likewise made in the course of a 
job duty, granting protection only where the employee had some public 
concern motive.61  For example, in Morris v. Crow, the Eleventh Circuit 
refused to grant First Amendment protection to a sheriff’s investigator who 
reported that a fellow officer violated department protocol in causing a fatal 
accident on the grounds that the report “was generated pursuant to his official 
and customary duties as an accident investigator.”62  In so ruling, the court 
looked at the purpose of the speech to determine if it was made as a citizen on 
a matter of public concern.63  The court concluded the sheriff deputy’s purpose 
 
 58. See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1176–77 (citing Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 161–64 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that a public employee did not forgo First Amendment protection when he 
refused to present proposed policy changes in a positive light to the Connecticut Gaming Policy 
Board); Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 367–76 (5th Cir. 
2000) (refusing to deny First Amendment protection to a library branch manager who wrote a 
letter to her supervisors suggesting security measures to be taken at library branches); Rodgers v. 
Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 597–02 (6th Cir. 2003) (refusing to deny protection to a director of quality 
management who sent a memorandum stating that the reconfiguration of a patient area would 
have an adverse effect on patient care); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 643–46 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that police reports raising allegations of brutality against fellow officer touched upon a 
matter of public concern); Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 519 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to deny 
protection to an officer’s allegations of criminal activities involving a relative of an elected 
official simply because he included them in a memorandum to his supervisors); Dill v. City of 
Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that an officer’s statements and 
reports to his supervisors regarding his belief that exculpatory evidence existed and was being 
withheld in a murder case involved a matter of public concern)); see also Zack, supra note 50, at 
906–08 (showing how, like the Ninth Circuit in Ceballos, most other circuits have either 
expressly or implicitly rejected a per se rule). 
 59. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1177 n.7 (quoting Delgado, 282 F.3d at 519). 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 61. See Zack, supra note 50, at 908–09 (explaining the distinctions adopted by the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits). 
 62. 142 F.3d 1379, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 63. See id. at 1382. 
Not only must the speech be related to matters of public interest, but the purpose of the 
expression must be to present such issues as matters of  “public” concern.  In essence, we 
must determine the purpose of the employee’s speech, that is, “whether the speech at issue 
was made primarily in the employee’s role as citizen, or primarily in the role of 
employee.” 
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was not to bring to light a matter of public concern.64  The court compared a 
Tenth Circuit decision, Koch v. City of Hutchinson,65 where a fire marshal was 
required to write a report, with its own decision in Fikes v. City of Daphne,66 
where a report was written by a police officer voluntarily and under no 
obligation.67  While in both cases the plaintiffs’ responsibilities involved 
investigations, the fire marshal’s report “was simply one of many routine 
official reports which are processed through the city’s local governmental 
agencies on a daily basis”68 while the police officer “sought to bring to light 
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of 
government officials.”69  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit hinged the analysis on the 
subjective intent or purpose of the employee, not his position in the 
organization. 
The Third Circuit squarely addressed the issue of public employees 
terminated for speech made pursuant to their job function in Baldassare v. New 
Jersey.70  In this case, a supervising investigator in the Bergen County 
Prosecutors Office was asked to investigate alleged criminal activity by two of 
his employees and was later allegedly retaliated against for exposing 
wrongdoing.71  It was undisputed that the investigator was required to conduct 
such an investigation.72  As such, the defense tried to rely on Morris73 to argue 
that since he preformed such action in the normal course of his job duties and 
his purpose was not to bring to light wrongdoing, it did not satisfy the matter 
of public concern threshold.74  In rejecting this argument, the Third Circuit 
relied on its own precedent,75 as well as Givhan,76 to “decline . . . to distinguish 
 
Id. (quoting Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 
(1994)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 847 F.2d 1436, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988) (holding that 
while no per se rule exists removing constitutional protection from public employee speech that is 
an integral part of the employee’s job, the fire marshal’s lack of motive to expose wrongdoing by 
other government officials in writing a report on a fire was merely part of performing his 
employment duties and thus not protected by the First Amendment). 
 66. 79 F.3d 1079, 1081, 1084 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that a police officer’s report of 
misconduct by fellow officers in a high speed chase addressed a matter of public concern). 
 67. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382. 
 68. Id. (quoting Koch, 847 F.2d at 1447) (internal quotation omitted). 
 69. Id. (quoting Fikes, 79 F.3d at 1084) (internal quotation omitted). 
 70. 250 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 71. Id. at 192–93. 
 72. Id. at 196. 
 73. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
 74. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 196. 
 75. Id. (citing Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1995).  An auditor’s 
report to the agency’s executive director and board of directors satisfied the matter of public 
concern requirement because “[t]he very purpose of his auditing reports was to ferret out and 
highlight any improprieties that he found at [the Pennsylvania Housing Authority].  Disclosing 
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between a public employee’s expression ‘as an employee’ and a public 
employee’s expression ‘as a citizen.’”77  The court reasoned that “the internal 
character of the investigation is not necessarily significant, because our inquiry 
focuses on the nature of the information, not its audience.”78  In other words, 
the value of the speech was dispositive in deciding if something was a matter 
of public concern.79 
II.  GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS 
A. Factual Background 
In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, worked as a calendar deputy 
district attorney employed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 
Office.80  In this role he was responsible for supervising two to three other 
deputy district attorneys.81  In late February of 2000, Ceballos was told by a 
defense attorney that there were inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a 
search warrant in one of the cases being prosecuted by the district attorney’s 
office.82 Although the defense attorney had filed a motion to challenge the 
warrant, he asked Ceballos to review the case as well.83  After examining the 
affidavit, visiting the location it described,84 and speaking with the warrant 
affiant, Ceballos determined that the affidavit contained “serious 
misrepresentations”85 and wrote his supervisors, Carol Najera and Frank 
 
corruption, fraud and illegality in a government agency is a matter of significant public concern.”  
Id. (quoting Feldman, 43 F.3d at 829) (alteration in original). 
 76. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 77. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 197 (citing Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 979 
(3d Cir. 1997)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006). 
 81. Id.; Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 82. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1955; see also Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1170–71 
(noting that the defense attorney suspected that one of the arresting deputy sheriff’s lied in order 
to get the search warrant). 
 83. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1955.  According to Ceballos, this was not an 
uncommon request.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
The affidavit called a long driveway what Ceballos thought should have been referred to 
as a separate roadway. Ceballos also questioned the affidavit’s statement that tire tracks 
led from a stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the warrant.  His doubts arose 
from his conclusion that the roadway’s composition in some places made it difficult or 
impossible to leave visible tire tracks.” 
Id.  
 85. Id. 
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Sundstedt, a disposition memorandum recommending dismissal of the case.86  
Ceballos did not dispute that he prepared the memorandum pursuant to his 
duties as a prosecutor.87  After a “heated” meeting between Ceballos, Najera, 
Sundstedt, and the affiant, Sundstedt nevertheless proceeded with the 
prosecution, pending the outcome of a motion hearing on the validity of the 
affidavit.88  Ceballos was subpoenaed to testify by the defense counsel for this 
hearing.89  Ceballos alleged that, as a result of the memorandum and his 
testimony, he had been subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions 
by his employers, including being demoted, transferred to another courthouse, 
and denied a promotion.90  After his employment grievance was denied, 
Ceballos sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, claiming that the alleged retaliation was in violation of his First 
Amendment rights.91 
B. Procedural History 
The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protection 
because he had written the memo pursuant to his employment duties.92  In 
reversing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, at least for summary judgment 
purposes, the First Amendment protected Ceballos’s speech.93  The court 
 
 86. Id. at 1955–56; see also Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171 (Ceballos was also asked to revise 
the memorandum to make it less accusatory of the sheriff.). 
 87. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 88. Id. at 1956; see also Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171 (Ceballos’s supervisors agreed that the 
affidavit’s validity was questionable.). 
 89. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.  When Ceballos testified at the hearing, the court “sustained 
the prosecution’s objections to several questions defense counsel asked him.  Ceballos maintains 
that, as a result, he was unable to tell the court certain of his conclusions (and the reasons 
therefor) regarding the accuracy of the warrant.  The defendant’s motion was denied, and the 
prosecution proceeded.”  Id. 
 90. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1956; see also Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171–72. 
[Ceballos] alleges that the defendants took a number of retaliatory actions against him: (1) 
they demoted him from his position of calendar deputy to that of trial deputy; (2) Najera 
“threatened” him when he told her that he would testify truthfully at the hearing; (3) at the 
hearing itself Najera was “rude and hostile” to him; (4) Sundstedt “gave [him] the silent 
treatment”; (5) Najera informed him that he could either transfer to the El Monte Branch, 
or, if he wanted to remain in the Pomona Branch, he would be re-assigned to filing 
misdemeanors, a position usually assigned to junior deputy district attorneys; (6) the one 
murder case he was handling at the time was reassigned to a deputy district attorney with 
no experience trying murder cases; (7) he was barred from handling any further murder 
cases; and (8) he was denied a promotion. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 91. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, ARE YOU A “CITIZEN”? 601 
reached this determination by using the Pickering/Connick balancing test to 
determine that the memo, which had recited alleged governmental misconduct, 
was a matter of public concern, and Ceballos’s interest in this speech 
outweighed the supervisors’ interest in responding to such speech because 
there had been no suggestion of disruption or inefficiency in the workings of 
the district attorney’s office as a result of the memorandum.94  With respect to 
the “matter of public concern” threshold, the court specifically rejected the 
defense’s argument that the speech was not protected because it was “prepared 
in fulfillment of an employment responsibility.”95  The court reasoned that 
such a holding would not be in line with Connick or its own precedent.96 
Specifically, the court found Roth v. Veteran’s Administration of the United 
States,97 which held that a “troubleshooter” in defendant agency could not be 
denied free speech protection for preparing reports exposing wrongdoing 
pursuant to his job function, controlling here.98  Furthermore, the court was 
concerned that since public employees are uniquely positioned to expose 
abuse,99 limiting their free speech rights “would seriously undermine our 
ability to maintain the integrity of our governmental operations.”100  Also, a 
per se rule limiting speech would be “detrimental to whistleblowers . . . who 
report official misconduct up the chain of command, because all public 
employees have a duty to notify their supervisors about any wrongful conduct 
of which they become aware.”101 
In a concurring opinion, Judge O’Scannlain agreed that Roth was 
controlling but felt the Ninth Circuit should hear Ceballos’s claim en banc and 
overrule Roth.102  He asserted that Roth’s emphasis on the employee’s point in 
bringing wrongdoing to light missed the mark in that it deems irrelevant the 
role of the speaker.103  Generally speaking, as support, Judge O’Scannlain 
argued that Roth was inconsistent with the premises of Connick and that other 
 
 94. Id. at 1178–80. 
 95. Id. at 1174. 
 96. Id. at 1174–75. 
 97. 856 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 98. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174. 
 99. Id. at 1175 (“The right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern 
is important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public employees, by 
virtue of their access to information and experience regarding the operations, conduct, and 
policies of government agencies and officials, are positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate 
on matters of public concern.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 100. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 101. Id. at 1176 (“To deprive public employees of constitutional protection when they fulfill 
this employment obligation, while affording them protection if they bypass their supervisors and 
take their tales, for profit or otherwise, directly to a scandal sheet or to an internet political smut 
purveyor defies sound reason.”). 
 102. Id. at 1185 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring). 
 103. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1187. 
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circuits have recognized a distinction between employee speech and citizen 
speech.104 
C. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion 
In a five to four decision,105 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
holding that Ceballos’s claim that he was unconstitutionally retaliated against 
failed because the First Amendment did not protect his speech.106  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that when state or federal employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and thus government 
employees are not insulated from discipline based on their official 
communications.107 
Justice Kennedy began his opinion by tracing the rights and limits placed 
on employee speech by the Pickering and Connick decisions.108  He recognized 
that the First Amendment “protects a public employee’s right, in certain 
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”109  
In clarifying in which instances speech is protected, Justice Kennedy 
interpreted the Pickering/Connick test to require a court to 
[first determine] whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of 
action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.  If the answer is 
yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.  The question 
becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification 
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public.110 
He commented that this test has proved somewhat “difficult” in that it 
requires the courts to deal with an “enormous variety of fact situations” when 
trying to strike a balance.111 
 
 104. Id. at 1186–88 (citing Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
 105. Garcetti was originally argued before the Supreme Court on October 12, 2005.  It has 
been speculated that the reason the case was reargued on March 21, 2006 was to allow Justice 
Alito, who was confirmed in January 2006, to break the four to four deadlock.  See Sonya Bice, 
Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as 
Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 45, 
61 (2007); Krystal LoPilato, Note, Recent Cases: Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose 
First Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 537, 541 n.24 (2006). 
 106. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006). 
 107. Id. at 1960. 
 108. Id. at 1957–59. 
 109. Id. at 1957 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 1958 (citations omitted). 
 111. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1958. 
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However, this test reflects the “Court’s overarching objectives,” namely 
that “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a significant 
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there 
would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”112  The 
Court cited Waters v. Churchill as support for its position that, “[w]hen a 
citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain 
limitations on his or her freedom.”113  The Court additionally saw as a public 
policy concern that since public employees often hold trusted positions in 
society, “[w]hen they speak out, they can express views that contravene 
governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental 
functions.”114 
Despite this need for government control and efficiency, Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that the Court’s precedent reflected the view that “a citizen who 
works for the government is nonetheless a citizen”115 and the Court is thus 
charged with ensuring that “citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by 
virtue of working for the government.”116  In addition, well-informed views of 
government employees provide an overall benefit to society by perpetuating 
civil discourse, a necessity in a democratic society.117  “The Court’s decisions, 
then, have sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are 
served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to 
respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their 
important public functions.”118 
Applying these somewhat contradictory principles to the facts of this case, 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the fact Ceballos’s speech occurred inside 
the office is non-dispositive.119  He also said that because “[t]he First 
Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job,” the fact 
that the memo “concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’s employment” is 
also not dispositive.120  What was controlling was that Ceballos’s “expressions 
were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”121  He concluded that 
since this was the dispositive issue, it gave rise to the rule that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 667 (1994) (plurality) (“[T]he government 
as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 147 (1983)). 
 117. See supra note 5. 
 118. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1959. 
 119. Id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 120. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 1959–60 (emphasis added). 
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not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”122 
Under this rule, it is “immaterial whether [Ceballos] experienced some 
personal gratification from writing the memo . . . .  The significant point is that 
the memo was written pursuant to Ceballos’ official duties.”123  Specifically, 
the Court concluded that “Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about 
conducting his daily professional activities . . . .  In the same way he did not 
speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a 
pending criminal case.”124  The Court concluded that this rule was consistent 
with precedent in that government employees can still participate in public 
discourse, the rule simply “does not invest them with a right to perform their 
jobs however they see fit.”125  The Court also concluded that this holding was 
also consistent with its precedent of “affording government employers 
sufficient discretion to manage their operations.”126  Here, “[i]f Ceballos’ 
superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had the 
authority to take proper corrective action.”127 
Finally, the Court reasoned that the rule proposed by Ceballos and adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit “would commit state and federal court to a new, 
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications 
between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of 
official business.”128  The Court was worried that to hold contrary to the rule it 
adopted “would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of 
federalism and the separation of powers.”129 
The Court made two final points that are pertinent here.  First, the Court 
addressed the Ninth Circuit’s concern of a perceived doctrinal anomaly in that 
“it would be inconsistent to compel public employers to tolerate certain 
employee speech made publicly but not speech made pursuant to an 
employee’s assigned duties.”130  The Court concluded that if a government 
employer is “troubled by the perceived anomaly,” it retains “the option of 
instituting internal policies and procedures that are receptive to employee 
 
 122. Id. at 1960. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1960–61. 
 128. Id. at 1961. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. 1961. 
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criticism.”131  Second, since Ceballos did not dispute the fact that he wrote his 
memo pursuant to job duties, the court had “no occasion to articulate a 
comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s 
duties . . . .”132  However, Justice Kennedy noted that such an inquiry must be a 
“practical one,” thus rejecting Justice Souter’s suggestion that “employers can 
restrict employees’ rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”133 
D. The Dissents 
1. Justice Stevens 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the majority had 
improperly answered the question of when the First Amendment protected a 
public employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to his 
employment duties.134  While the Court held that the answer to this question is 
a cut and dried “Never,” Justice Stevens believed that the answer should be 
“Sometimes.”135  He argued that the rule should allow a government 
employee’s supervisor to take corrective action when the employee’s speech 
was “inflammatory or misguided,” but not when such speech was merely 
“unwelcome.”136  In supporting this position, Justice Stevens pointed out that 
the Court was silent on the issue of whether or not the teacher in Givhan spoke 
pursuant to her job duties.137  He said such silence on the issue in the past 
means that the distinction is “immaterial.”138  He felt that constitutional 
protections should not hinge on job descriptions and to fashion a rule enticing 
employees to voice concerns publicly rather then privately seemed 
“perverse.”139 
2. Justice Souter 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg, expanded on this 
same idea of a “sometimes” rather then a “never” answer to this question.  
Justice Souter would have held that 
 
 131. Id.  Justice Kennedy went on to say that “[g]iving employees an internal forum for their 
speech will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is to state their 
views in public.”  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1962 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. 
 136. Id.  In a footnote, he also noted a plethora of cases in which employee discipline might 
have been attempts to conceal corruption or “managerial ineptitude.”  Id. at 1962–63 n.*. 
 137. Id. at 1963. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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private and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to 
health and safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on 
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible to claim First 
Amendment protection.140 
In other words, as long as the well-informed speech in question is not 
overly damaging to the government’s ability to conduct the public’s business, 
it should be protected.141  He questioned why the majority’s concerns about 
government efficiency required a fully categorical restriction on First 
Amendment rights.142  He believed these concerns could adequately be 
addressed by holding that “an employee commenting on subjects in the course 
of duties should not prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual 
importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does 
it.”143  Justice Souter went on to point out a few of the public policy concerns 
associated with applying the strict rule that the majority applied, namely that 
the Court has previously recognized that public employees are uniquely 
situated to inform the public on important issues.144  He further criticized the 
whistleblower remedy that the majority proposed to deal with this public 
policy concern.145  A final important concern of Justice Souter was that public 
employers could unreasonably expand employees’ job descriptions in an effort 
to diminish the availability of First Amendment protection.146 
3. Justice Breyer 
In his separate dissent, Justice Breyer also took issue with the Court 
answering the issue with a cut and dried “never.”147  Justice Breyer suggested 
that the majority did not recognize that “there may well be circumstances with 
special demand for constitutional protection of the speech at issue, where 
governmental justifications may be limited, and where administrable standards 
 
 140. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1963 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 141. LoPilato, supra note 105 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1964 (Souter, 
J., dissenting)). 
 142. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1966. 
Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public employees are often 
the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the 
operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the 
public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of 
informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public’s 
interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it. 
Id. (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004)). 
 145. Id. at 1970; see also infra Part VII. 
 146. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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seem readily available . . . .”148  As such, he thought that the First Amendment 
allows for judicial action in such cases where there is an “augmented need for 
constitutional protection, and diminished risk of undue judicial interference 
with governmental management of the public’s affairs.”149  He thought such an 
augmented need for special constitutional protection existed here because the 
speech at issue was more “professional speech” than government speech.150  
As an attorney, Ceballos’s speech was “subject to independent regulation by 
canons of the profession.”151  Where those canons obligate certain speech, the 
government’s ability to restrict it is diminished.152  Second, there is an 
independent constitutional obligation on a prosecutor to “communicate with 
the defense about exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the government’s 
possession.”153  However, Justice Breyer also believed that Justice Souter’s 
position provided too much coverage and thus “fail[ed] to give sufficient 
weight to the serious managerial and administrative concerns that the majority 
describes.”154 
III.  THE NEW “CITIZENSHIP” PRONG TO THE PICKERING/CONNICK TEST 
The de facto result of the Garcetti decision is to add a new prong to the 
Pickering/Connick test defining when the First Amendment protects a public 
employee’s speech.  As shown above, Connick makes clear that a public 
employee must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that they are speaking on a 
matter of public concern, rather then out of private significance, before their 
interest in the speech is balanced against the harm to the government as an 
employer.155  The Garcetti decision adds a second threshold inquiry that must 
be dealt with before striking the Pickering balance.156  This Garcetti threshold 
requires an employee to demonstrate that they are in fact speaking as a 
“citizen.”157  As defined, speaking “as a citizen” means that the speech is not 
made pursuant to the employee’s “official duties.”158  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court’s decision makes clear that the proper inquiry for a court confronting an 
employee First Amendment claim is that the employee must demonstrate (1) 
they are a speaking as a citizen and not as an official employee on a matter 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1976. 
 150. Id. at 1974. 
 151. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1974. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1975 (“The underlying problem with this breadth of coverage is that the standard . . 
. does not avoid the judicial need to undertake the balance in the first place.”). 
 155. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 156. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 157. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). 
 158. Id. 
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pursuant to their job function, (2) they are speaking on a matter of public 
concern rather then on a matter of private interest, and (3) their interest in the 
speech outweighs the interest of the government in promoting efficient 
operation of their offices.159 
In promulgating this new prong, Justice Kennedy applied an emphasis to 
the phrase “as a citizen” in the Pickering and Connick decisions.160  In 
Garcetti, Justice Kennedy used this phrase as a limitation, restricting the rights 
of employees by making a distinction between government employees acting 
within the course of their job function and other citizens, while reserving the 
rights of free speech to citizens.161  However, the phrase “as a citizen” found in 
the precedent on which Justice Kennedy relied has not carried the connotations 
of being a limiting phrase.  For instance, in Pickering, the Court cited 
numerous cases rejecting the notion that “teachers may constitutionally be 
compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise 
enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with 
the operation of the public schools in which they work . . . .”162  The Pickering 
Court cited these cases in rejecting the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court 
which held “[a] teacher who displays disrespect toward the Board of 
Education, incites misunderstanding and distrust of its policies, and makes 
unsupported accusations against the officials is not promoting the best interests 
of his school . . . .”163  In effect, the Supreme Court took issue with the fact that 
the Illinois Supreme Court did not even address the citizenship rights that the 
teacher had.164  The Illinois Supreme Court focused solely on the rights of the 
 
 159. See id. at 1958. 
 160. Id. at 1957. 
 161. See id. at 1960. 
Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his daily professional 
activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings.  In 
the same way he did not speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper 
disposition of a pending criminal case. 
Id. 
 162. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 
183 (1952)) (emphasis added). 
 163. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967), with Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 568.  The Supreme Court held in Pickering that 
[t]o the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that 
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they 
would otherwise enjoy as citizens . . . it proceeds on a premise that has been 
unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court. 
391 U.S. at 568. 
 164. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“‘[T]he theory that public employment which may be 
denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been 
uniformly rejected.’”) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605–06). 
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school district as an employer and ignored the citizenship rights of the 
teacher.165  The use of the term “as a citizen” in the Supreme Court’s decision 
was meant to show that public employees do not relinquish their basic 
citizenship speech rights by virtue of accepting public employment.  It was 
meant to be an enabling term protecting the rights that government employees 
have compared with the rights of their employers.166  By using such language, 
the Court permanently repudiated the old Holmesian doctrine that employees 
could be forced to relinquish the rights they hold “as citizens” in exchange for 
a paycheck.167 
More evidence that the term “as a citizen” was meant to be an enabling 
term rather then a limit on public employees, is the fact that, despite the litany 
of public employee free speech cases that have reached the Supreme Court, 
none prior to Garcetti have hinged the inquiry on whether the employee spoke 
“as a citizen” or as an employee.  Justice Kennedy referred to the fact that 
Ceballos’s expressions were made pursuant to his job as a calendar deputy as 
“the controlling factor.”168  However, whether or not the expressions were 
made pursuant to a job duty was not dispositive in Pickering, Connick, or 
Givhan.169  It is the Supreme Court’s silence on this issue that “speaks the 
loudest.”170  As such, there was little support for why the fact that Ceballos’s 
expressions were made pursuant to his job was the controlling factor.171  In 
 
 165. See Pickering, 225 N.E.2d at 7. 
There is nothing in the record before us to indicate malice on the part of the board 
members toward the plaintiff, nor does it appear that the board’s action was impulsive or 
capricious.  The administration of the schools is within the domain of the school board, 
and courts do not interfere with the exercise of its powers unless it is shown to be 
capricious or arbitrary. 
Id. 
 166. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”). 
 167. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 168. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959–60 (2006). 
 169. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–48 (1983) (hinging the inquiry on the fact that 
the employee’s comments were of private rather than public concern); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. 
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (applying the Pickering balance to private expressions of 
employees in the same manner as public expressions); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (hinging the 
inquiry on a balance between “the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”). 
 170. Kathryn B. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging 
Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 90 (2006). 
 171. The Court did not explain why it felt this was the controlling factor other than pointing 
to the “as a citizen” language in Pickering, nor did it provide any precedent for articulating this as 
the dispositive issue.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1959–60. 
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fact, Justice Stevens went so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court’s silence 
on this issue in prior cases, such as Givhan, demonstrated that it was 
“immaterial.”172  The immateriality of the “as a citizen” requirement is further 
bolstered by the fact that the Court has not consistently used the phrase “as a 
citizen” when summarizing the Pickering/Connick test.  Justice O’Connor, for 
instance, omitted the term entirely when summarizing this basic test in Waters 
v. Churchill.173  While this clearly could have just been an oversight, the ability 
to overlook the term when quoting Pickering does not lend much credence to 
the degree of importance Justice Kennedy attached to it.  However, if its 
exclusion was intentional, thus signaling Justice O’Connor’s apparent 
understanding of its immateriality to the Pickering/Connick test, one can only 
speculate whether this five to four decision would have swung in Ceballos’s 
favor had Justice Alito (who joined the majority) not recently replaced her.174 
From this perspective, it appears that the term “as a citizen” in the original 
Pickering decision was not meant to be a threshold requirement in the same 
way that the Connick Court saw the phrase “on a matter of public concern.”  
Rather, it seems more likely that in the original language of Pickering, namely, 
“[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees,”175 “as a citizen” was meant to be 
analogous to “as an employer.”  These two terms seemingly were meant to be 
shorthand for the free speech rights of a citizen as compared to the employer’s 
rights in promoting efficiency.  In other words, Pickering’s use of the term “as 
a citizen” recognized that American citizens, whether they are government 
employees or not, should not be forced to categorically give up their free 
speech rights simply by virtue of their employment.176  Similarly, the use of the 
term “as an employer” recognized that employers, whether an arm of the 
government or not, should not have to categorically relinquish their right to 
 
 172. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our silence as to whether or not [Givhan’s] speech 
was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that the point was immaterial.”). 
 173. 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994). 
There is no dispute in this case about when speech by a government employee is protected 
by the First Amendment: To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public 
concern, and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be 
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees. 
Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 174. See supra note 105. 
 175. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 176. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1957. 
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conduct their business in an orderly fashion.177  Thus as Pickering held, by 
virtue of the collision of these two important constitutional rights, a balancing 
is necessary.178 
Reading Pickering in the light explained here would thus not treat the fact 
that an individual’s speech was made pursuant to his job function as a 
threshold bar.  Rather, it would incorporate this fact into the traditional 
balancing test as strong evidence of an adverse effect on the employer’s right 
to promote efficiency.  Obviously, the fact that the employee was speaking 
within the course of his job function should be taken into account.  However, 
as Justice Souter points out in his dissent, there is no indication that these 
concerns cannot adequately be addressed by using the Pickering balancing test 
as it was understood by the Ninth Circuit.179  This strict balancing approach 
would hold that “an employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties 
should not prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual 
importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does 
it.”180  This approach would be effective in limiting an employee from 
speaking out about petty concerns in the course of his or her job duties but 
would also protect employees who speak with the intent or purpose of 
exposing “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other 
serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”181 
The result of such an interpretation of the phrase “as a citizen” would 
change the answer to the question of “whether the First Amendment protects a 
government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties” to “Sometimes” rather than “Never.”182  Using this 
strict balancing test rather than creating a threshold bar would require a higher 
degree of scrutiny where the employee speaks pursuant to a job duty as 
opposed to merely on a subject of employment but would not have the 
drawbacks of a “winner-take-all” blanket restriction on First Amendment 
rights.183  Without twisting the emphasis on the term “as a citizen,” thereby 
creating a threshold inquiry, the Court can still achieve its goal of protecting 
the government’s interest in carrying out its public duties.184  Yet, the 
government would not be allowed to suppress job duty speech where the 
disruption is very limited and both the employee’s and the public’s interest in 
 
 177. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 178. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 179. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1962 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted). 
 183. See id. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the lesson of Pickering is that when 
competing constitutionally significant interest clash, the Court should “try to make adjustments 
that serve all of the values at stake”). 
 184. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the speech is extremely high.  Given that a heightened balancing standard can 
adequately quell the Court’s concerns, the manner in which it emphasizes or 
re-defines the meaning of the term “as a citizen” almost forty years after 
Pickering and thus in effect hinges constitutional protection on a job 
description by creating a new prong to an old test seems at the very least 
“misguided.”185 
A final point worth noting is that the Court’s opinion does not address 
Ceballos’s testimony at the hearing on the affidavit’s validity.186  In fact, in 
setting out the facts of the case, the Court does not mention that Ceballos was 
in fact subpoenaed to testify about his findings.187  The defense in this case 
only contended that the memo was not protected speech.188  However, one 
could imagine that if Ceballos was subjected to retaliation the motive for such 
action would have been more a consequence of the testimony than the memo in 
that the testimony was a public expression of wrongdoing, presumably drawing 
more outside attention.  However, without this issue being adjudicated, we are 
left to wonder just how far the application of the per se Garcetti rule is meant 
to go.  Surely the Court cannot mean that Garcetti stands for the proposition 
that an employee can be disciplined for obeying a statutory duty, such as 
responding to a subpoena.  To hold otherwise would allow an employer to 
condition the retention of employment on forcing an employee to violate the 
law.189  The Court must permit a public policy exception here so employees are 
not faced with a decision between obeying the law and protecting their 
livelihood.190  As Justice Breyer pointed out, there must at a minimum be an 
exception to the Garcetti threshold rule for such special circumstances that 
require independent constitutional protection.191  However, as currently 
written, Garcetti seemingly does not allow for such exceptions.192 
 
 185. See id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the majority decision may not 
be “inflammatory,” it surely is “misguided” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 186. See id. at 1959–60 (discussing what was dispositive about the nature in which the memo 
was prepared, but not mentioning the testimony). 
 187. Compare Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1956 with Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 
F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 188. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 189. See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985) (holding 
that there is a “public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine where an employee 
was told she would be fired for obeying a subpoena to appear before the state equal employment 
commission). 
 190. See id. 
 191. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 192. See id. (arguing that the Pickering balancing test should be applied in these situations 
requiring special constitutional protection even if the speech is made pursuant to a job duty). 
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IV.  APPLYING GARCETTI: FORMALISM AND THE “PRACTICAL INQUIRY” 
One of the main justifications for the Supreme Court adopting this per se 
threshold rule was that it would avoid placing courts in a “new, permanent, and 
intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business.”193  The “need” for a per se threshold rule restricting free speech in a 
whole category of situations is justified by its appeal to those Justices “who 
seek bright line rules, rather than the ad hoc balancing which currently prevails 
under Pickering.”194  This argument stems from the fear that without limits on 
the pure Pickering balancing of interests every employee grievance would rise 
to the level of a First Amendment claim and that “government offices could 
not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”195  
“Such a result would be an undue intrusion by the courts into the management 
of public agencies . . . .”196  This line of reasoning is stressed by the Court’s 
“formalist” Justices who prefer drawing bright line rules across all aspects of 
the Court’s constitutional doctrine.197  “A per se rule is a judicial shortcut; it 
represents the considered judgment of courts, after considerable experience 
with a particular type of restraint, that the rule of reason—the normal mode of 
analysis—can be dispensed with.”198  The perceived advantages of such an 
approach are “ensuring predictability, uniformity, and transparency, as well as 
in limiting future judicial discretion.”199 
Yet as the first two years of post-Garcetti decisions demonstrate, the per se 
rule has not had any of these effects.  This new rule has not had the effect of 
removing courts from the loathed position of reviewing employment 
decisions.200  The irony of the Garcetti rule, however, is that while the Court 
justifies the per se rule by claiming that they are trying to avoid placing the 
courts into a “new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight 
 
 193. Id. at 1961 (majority opinion). 
 194. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name 
of “Efficiency,” 23 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 17, 18 n.3 (1996) (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law 
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)). 
 195. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
 196. Allred, supra note 46, at 454 n.187 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). 
 197. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging 
Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1202 (2007).  Professor Rhodes 
concludes that Justices Scalia and Thomas are “committed formalists,” Justices Roberts and Alito 
are “attracted to formalism,” and that Justice Kennedy is “particularly enamored of formalism in 
the free speech context.”  Id. at 1202–03. 
 198. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 199. Rhodes, supra note 197, at 1175. 
 200. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (“[A] federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to 
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the 
employee’s behavior.”). 
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of communications between and among government employees and their 
superiors,”201 they instead place courts in the new, permanent, and intrusive 
role of mandating judicial oversight of job descriptions and duties of 
employment.202  As the Fifth Circuit notes, Garcetti merely “shift[s] [the 
court’s] focus from the content of the speech to the role the speaker occupied 
when he said it.”203  As such, the application of the Garcetti rule proves to be 
far less “formalistic” than was intended.  Rather than achieving its intended 
effect, the rule has only confused courts and litigants.  As Justice Scalia is 
quick to point out, such confusion breeds further litigation.204 
Applying the Court’s new per se rule to the facts of Garcetti was fairly 
straightforward. Ceballos did not dispute that the memo was written pursuant 
to his job function.205  This, however, is the exception rather than the rule.  
Particularly in the wake of Garcetti, most public employees bringing a First 
Amendment retaliation claim will dispute whether or not their speech was 
made pursuant to a job function.206  In order to ensure that most employee 
speech is made pursuant to a job function, Justice Souter worried that 
government employers would move to unreasonably expand employee job 
descriptions in order to limit the little First Amendment protection that 
employees have left.207  In other words, employers could attempt to create 
excessively large job descriptions in an effort to minimize the ability of 
employees to speak out about perceived misconduct.  The majority briefly 
rejected this concern.208  The majority stated that employers cannot create 
excessively large job descriptions because what is or is not done pursuant to a 
 
 201. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006). 
 202. Id. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s response, that the enquiry to 
determine duties is a ‘practical one,’ does not alleviate this concern.  It sets out a standard that 
will not discourage government employers from setting duties expansively, but will engender 
litigation to decide which stated duties were actual and which were merely formal.”). 
 203. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 204. Bd. of County Comm’r v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 698 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 205. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 206. Bice, supra note 105, at 73. 
 207. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Souter stated: 
I am pessimistic enough to expect that one response to the Court’s holding will be moves 
by government employers to expand stated job descriptions to include more official duties 
and so exclude even some currently protectable speech from First Amendment purview.  
Now that the government can freely penalize the school personnel officer for criticizing 
the principal because speech on the subject falls within the personnel officer’s job 
responsibilities, the government may well try to limit the English teacher’s options by the 
simple expedient of defining teachers’ job responsibilities expansively, investing them 
with a general obligation to ensure sound administration of the school. 
Id. 
 208. Id. at 1961 (majority opinion). 
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job duty is not determined by a written job description, but rather is determined 
by a practical inquiry.209  However, the majority gives little guidance as to how 
lower courts should undertake this practical inquiry other than to note that 
formal job descriptions and the fact that the employee spoke on the subject 
matter of her employment are not dispositive.210  The majority did not feel the 
need to expand further since Ceballos did not contest that his memo was 
written pursuant to a job function; thus, they did not have occasion to discuss a 
“comprehensive framework for defining the scope of employment duties.”211 
A lack of a “comprehensive framework” for engaging in a “practical 
inquiry” leaves a number of major questions unanswered for lower courts 
confronted with a Garcetti argument. Moreover, the Court provides little 
guidance as to which factors should be taken into consideration in actually 
conducting an inquiry into a specific job description, opening a Pandora’s box 
by encouraging litigating the specifics of the practical inquiry.  In practical 
terms, the inquiry really involves the applicability of Garcetti to speech that is 
not necessarily required by a government employee’s “job duties but 
nevertheless is related to his job duties.”212 
Justice Kennedy, in the majority opinion, drew a distinction between 
speech that is “the subject matter” of an employee’s job and speech “pursuant 
to job duties.”213  An employee’s speech can be protected if it is the “subject 
matter” of employment, but not if it is “pursuant to job duties.”214  While 
Justice Kennedy provided little explicit guidance on how this distinction 
should play out, other than that it requires a practical inquiry, he did focus on 
the distinction between the affirmative duty Ceballos’s position placed on him 
to investigate and report on inaccuracies in affidavits and the fact that the 
plaintiff in Pickering had no obligation to comment on school budgets.215  
Thus, it appears that if the employee is absolutely required to speak as a result 
of the essence of his job, then it is “pursuant to job duties.”  However, if the 
employee has a choice of whether or not to speak up then the speech is merely 
the “subject matter” of his employment.  In wrestling with this issue, the Fifth 
Circuit held that Garcetti applies to speech made in the “course of performing” 
 
 209. Id. (“The proper inquiry is a practical one.”).  In performing this practical inquiry, the 
Court recognized that “[f]ormal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an 
employee actually is expected to perform.” Id. at 1962. 
 210. Id. at 1960. 
 211. Id. at 1961. 
 212. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added). 
 213. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1959–60. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 1961. 
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job duties.216  However, this course of performance language does little to clear 
up the ambiguity surrounding when a court should apply the Garcetti rule. 
As such, in the first two years of post-Garcetti decisions, courts have 
“struggle[d] to define the breadth of Garcetti and its impact on First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”217  In the immediate aftermath of the case being 
handed down, courts were reluctant to apply Garcetti where the plaintiff had 
not admitted the speech was made pursuant to his job function.  Some of the 
earliest post-Garcetti scholarship noted that “there is reason to believe Garcetti 
is less pro-employer then it would initially appear.”218  One reason for this 
sentiment was that courts were reluctant to simply take an employer’s word as 
to what an employee’s official duties were.219  Plaintiffs used this line of 
argument in effectively resisting summary judgment.220  Courts were only 
applying the Garcetti rule in situations where the speech was truly the essence 
of the employer’s job.  In this way, the “elastic[ity]” of the per se rule could be 
used to “mitigate [the] potential harshness” of the Garcetti rule.221  However, 
as time has progressed, some courts have become increasingly liberal in their 
application of the per se rule.222  Specifically, they have become increasingly 
willing to apply Garcetti where the speech is made pursuant to a more 
peripheral or general “job duty.”223  The confusion surrounding the practical 
inquiry lead some lower courts to expand the scope of the Garcetti rule, and 
correspondingly, limit the speech protection afforded public employees.224  
Others have held firm in strictly construing the Garcetti rule.225 
One of the most frequently recurring examples of the various applications 
of this rule is differing jurisdictions’ treatment of peripheral or general job 
duties such as employee work rules that apply to an entire department or 
office.  Initially, courts were reluctant to use general work rules as justification 
to invoke the Garcetti rule.226  The Northern District of California read 
Garcetti as requiring an employer to do more then simply articulate a “duty” 
 
 216. Williams, 480 F.3d at 693. 
 217. Hailey v. City of Camden, No. 01-3967, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45267, at *46 (D.N.J. 
July 5, 2006). 
 218. Bice, supra note 105, at 76. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.; see also Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2006); 
Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 396 (D. Conn. 2006); Batt v. City of Oakland, No. 
C02-04975 (MHP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47889, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2006). 
 221. Bice, supra note 105, at 51. 
 222. See infra notes 242–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Barclay court superseding 
itself). 
 223. See generally infra notes 230–48 and accompanying text. 
 224. Id. 
 225. E.g., Taylor v. Town of Freetown, 479 F. Supp. 2d 227, 237 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 226. See, e.g., Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C02-04975 (MHP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47889, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2006). 
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imposed on an employee, but rather required the employer to show that the 
employee was “‘actually expected to perform’ the potentially protected act.”227  
A more recent District of Massachusetts decision refusing to apply Garcetti to 
general work rules recognized that applying Garcetti in such a fashion would 
“eliminate First Amendment protection whenever an employee speaks out 
regarding widespread matters of public concern because he had an obligation 
under the rules to tell his superior of any rule infractions.”228  The court refused 
to read Garcetti as “meant to strip an employee of First Amendment protection 
when speaking out regarding issues of serious and widespread public concern, 
like corruption, just because a garden-variety rule requires him to tell a 
supervisor.”229 
Despite the obvious concerns about applying Garcetti to more tangential 
job duties, some courts have increasingly done so.  Perhaps the most 
exemplary case of this is Barclay v. Michalsky and the pedagogy in the District 
of Connecticut that followed.230  In Barclay, a nurse claimed she was retaliated 
against for complaining about other nurses sleeping on the job and 
mistreatment of patients.231  The defense argued that under Garcetti the speech 
at issue was not protected by the First Amendment because the plaintiff had an 
affirmative duty as part of her job responsibilities to report such violations.232  
A nurse, much like a lawyer, has independent professional obligations in 
addition to those placed on her by her job.233  As a nurse employed by the 
Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addictive Services, she was 
under a general obligation to report instances of patient abuse.234  Despite this 
contention, in the first few months after Garcetti came down, the district court 
held that there was a material issue of fact because “the record does not 
establish incontrovertibly that plaintiff made her complaints . . . as part of the 
discharge of her duties as a nurse.”235  In other words, reporting such instances 
 
 227. Id. at *11. 
 228. Taylor, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (rejecting defendant’s argument that work rules impose a 
general obligation on all police officers to report violations of department rules). 
 229. Id. 
 230. 451 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 231. Id. at 390–92. 
 232. Id. at 395. 
Defendants argue that Garcetti is controlling in this case on the basis that the complaints 
plaintiff allegedly made to her supervisors regarding employees sleeping on the job and 
the use of excessive restraints were made pursuant to her official duties because behavior 
that endangers the safety and welfare of persons is specifically prohibited by Work Rule # 
22 and employees have an affirmative duty pursuant to Work Rule # 30 to report 
violations of existing work rules, policies, procedures, or regulations. 
Id. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Barclay, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
618 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:589 
of alleged abuse was not pursuant to her job function.236  The District of 
Connecticut decided that general job duties common to each employee in the 
department or agency are not sufficient, even if they had an affirmative duty to 
speak up.237 
Subsequently, the Barclay rule was followed by a handful of District of 
Connecticut cases.238  For example, in Drolett v. Demarco, the court examined 
the defense’s argument that a police officer had a duty as part of the chain of 
command to make the speech in question.239  The court found the speech to be 
protected because it did not find the applicable police department rules to 
require the plaintiff to make the speech, but rather only permitted him to do 
so.240  The court quoted Barclay in holding that the defense did not prove that 
the plaintiff’s speech was “particularly within the province of the plaintiff’s 
professional duties, more so then that of other [police department] 
employees.”241 
However, less then a year later and with the “benefit of Garcetti progeny 
from the past year,” the Barclay court superseded its initial decision.242  In 
Barclay II, the court found Garcetti to be controlling, reversed its earlier 
decision, and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.243  The court 
held “that its previous interpretation of the scope of Garcetti was too 
restrictive.”244  The court thus found that the professional responsibilities and 
work rules created an obligation on the plaintiff to speak out on the matters she 
did.245 “The fact that other . . . employees may have shared this professional 
obligation does not change the outcome of Garcetti.”246  Many other courts 
have since agreed.247 
 
 236. See id.  The court held that the defendant had “not demonstrated that reporting potential 
work rule violations relating to patient care was particularly within the province of plaintiff's 
professional duties, more so than that of other DMHAS employees.”  Id. 
 237. See Lisa Siegel, State Can’t Squash Suit, CONN. L. TRIB., Sept. 27, 2006, at 1, 4. 
 238. See Paola v. Spada, 498 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (D. Conn. 2007); Drolett v. Demarco, No. 
3-05CV1335 (JCH), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46044, at *14–*15 (D. Conn. June 22, 2007); 
Gordon v. Marquis, No. 3:03CV01244 (AWT), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27811, at *24–25 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 31, 2007). 
 239. Drolett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46044, at *12. 
 240. Id. at *15. 
 241. Id. (quoting Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 396 (D. Conn. 2006)). 
 242. Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 243. Id. at 271, 277–78. 
 244. Id. at 274. 
 245. Id. at 277. 
 246. Id. 
 247. E.g., Pagani v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-CV-01115 (JCH), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92267 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006); Price v. MacLeish, No. 04-956 (GMS), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57026 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2006). 
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 The Barclay reversal demonstrates the confusion that exists over how to 
handle general professional or departmental obligations under the Garcetti 
rule.  This confusion led the defense in Drolett to appeal the district court’s 
decisions to the Second Court of Appeals.248  The defense’s contention is that 
the police department was entitled to qualified immunity because at the time it 
disciplined Drolett the law was uncertain.249  The defense notes that the 
“Garcetti Court failed to articulate a test for determining when an employee is 
speaking pursuant to his or her official duties, and the Circuit courts are 
struggling to find one.”250  Since the Garcetti principle is “difficult to apply” 
the defense contends that “under these circumstances, the individual 
Defendants could not reasonably have known that Drolett actually had the 
right he claimed or that their conduct violated this right.”251  As of the 
publication of this article the Second Circuit had not heard oral arguments on 
or ruled on this case. 
The evolution of how to handle general professional or departmental 
obligations is only one illustration of the litigious issues lower courts are 
struggling with in deciding if something rises to level of “pursuant to job 
duties” or is merely a “subject matter of employment.”  Similar issues have 
arisen in contexts such as non-written, ad hoc or de facto job duties252 and 
situations where the employee was specifically asked to comment.253  The 
plethora of unanswered questions under the “practical inquiry” demonstrates 
that the lack of a “comprehensive framework” invites a flood of litigation to 
decipher this “practical inquiry,”254 creating a situation ripe for unjust and 
inequitable results.  Aside from the extensive inquiry this rule will require into 
employees’ job functions, each government employee is in a slightly different 
position from every other government employee.  Even two employees with 
the same job title might have widely varying day-to-day activities.  For 
example, employees who work as a team on projects, such as in the 
 
 248. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, Drolett v. DeMarco, No. 07-3221-CV (2d Cir. Nov. 
19, 2007). 
 249. Id. at 5. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 5-6. 
 252. E.g., Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Garcetti . . . 
implicitly recognized that . . . ad hoc or de facto duties can fall within the scope of an employee’s 
official responsibilities despite not appearing in any written job description.”). 
 253. E.g., id. at 545; Jaworski v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., No. 05-4485 (AET), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6063, at *15 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2007). 
 254. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1968 (2006) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
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construction or maintenance industries, are often given the same title but 
significantly different day-to-day activities and responsibilities.255 
While arguably achieving its intended effect of limiting judicial oversight 
of communications between and among government employees and their 
superiors, the Garcetti rule has also invited a plethora of other litigious issues 
for the lower courts related to this “practical inquiry.”256  Rather than 
overseeing communications, courts have found themselves piercing the job 
descriptions of all government employees.  In doing so, courts have to engage 
in the uncomfortable “practical inquiry” of differentiating between general 
agency regulations, codes of professional conduct, job descriptions, and daily 
activities, which they are ill prepared for, while we await a “comprehensive 
framework” to deal with these issues from the Supreme Court.  This task 
seems “no less onerous then the pre-Garcetti” Pickering/Connick balance.257  
As previously noted, the rationale for Garcetti’s cut and dried threshold rule, 
as opposed to simply incorporating the fact that the employee was speaking 
pursuant to a job duty into the Pickering balance, seems to be undercut by this 
increase in litigation.258  On the other hand, the strict balancing approach 
advocated in this Note would not invite such litigation.  Justice Souter points 
out that the Ninth Circuit, which for seventeen years provided more protection 
than he would, or as argued for in this Note, has not created a flood of 
litigation.259  Rather, the claims would be dispensed with through a straight 
forward balancing of competing interests. 
V.  WHO IS A “PUBLIC EMPLOYEE”? 
Another litigious issue courts are increasingly going to have to decide, as a 
threshold matter, is whether the individual in question is really a “public 
employee.”  While in many, if not most, situations this will admittedly not be 
an issue.  In some instances courts will be forced to determine whether 
individuals are “public employees” within the meaning of Garcetti.  For 
example, the Court gave no indication as to whether Garcetti is applicable to 
different levels of management.  As such, courts have been or will be forced to 
 
 255. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (holding that a 
retaliatory adverse employment action occurred where the only woman working in a maintenance 
department was reassigned from her responsibilities of operating a form lift to standard laborer 
task, even though the former and present duties fell within the same job description that all 
employee’s in the department had). 
 256. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 257. Shubha Harris, Note, Silencing the Noise of Democracy—The Supreme Court Denies 
First Amendment Protection for Public Employees’ Job-Related Statements in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1183 (2007). 
 258. See supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text. 
 259. Id. 
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determine if the Garcetti rule is applicable to “quasi-government employees” 
such as elected officials, political appointees, and independent contractors. 
Ceballos himself served in a limited supervisory capacity.260  As such, 
lower courts have generally indiscriminately applied the Garcetti rule to public 
employees, even if they serve in relatively high-ranking capacities within the 
government bureaucracy.  For example, the chief of police of Fayette, 
Mississippi was held not to be speaking as a citizen for First Amendment 
purposes where he admitted the speech in question was made in his capacity as 
chief.261  The fact that the chief was a supervisor and ran his own department 
was never considered by the court.262  However, some courts have shown a 
willingness to consider the rank of an employee when applying the Garcetti 
rule.  The Fifth Circuit dealt with this issue in Jenevein v. Willing.263  In 
Jenevein, an elected state judge argued that he was censured in violation of the 
First Amendment.264  The Court held that although the judge is an employee of 
the state, his relationship with his employer differs from that of an “ordinary 
state employee” based on the manner in which he is “hired and fired,” namely 
through the democratic process.265  As such, the court held that the Pickering-
Garcetti line of cases is not applicable to the free speech rights of elected state 
officials.266  While from a practical standpoint the Fifth Circuit’s holding 
seems rational for a purely elected official, it has yet to be seen what effect 
Garcetti will have on the numerous positions somewhere between the typical 
“ordinary state employee” and the purely elected official. 
A related issue is how to apply the Garcetti rule to government contractors.  
A February 2007 New York Times article notes that the government is hiring 
contractors not only for their traditional purpose of building “ships and 
satellites” but also to staff positions traditionally held by civil servants.267  For 
example, the federal government recently hired a contractor to fill positions in 
the General Services Administration processing cases of incompetence and 
fraud by federal contractors.268  The people sent by the contractors to fill these 
positions work along side and perform indistinguishable functions as their civil 
 
 260. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 261. Williams v. City of Fayette, No. 5:05-cv-34 (DCB) (JMR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65235, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 11, 2006). 
 262. Id. 
 263. 493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 264. Id. at 555. 
 265. Id. at 557. 
 266. Id. at 558. 
 267. See Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest Role Ever, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at 1. 
 268. Id. 
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service counterparts.269  In fact, such widespread use of contractors has nearly 
doubled the federal government’s annual contractor spending since George W. 
Bush took office.270  Accordingly, courts will increasingly be forced to define 
how this new class of workers will be treated. 
Precedent seems to suggest that contractors can be subjected to the 
Garcetti threshold test if they speak on matters of governmental misconduct.  
In Board of County Commissioners  v. Umbehr, the Supreme Court applied the 
Pickering/Connick test to independent contractors.271  The rationale was that, 
like government employees, contractors working for the government are 
needed for a well-informed debate on matters of public concern because they 
are uniquely positioned to analyze specific issues within their particular 
government agency.272  At least one lower court used Umbehr as justification 
for applying Garcetti to a government contractor.273  The effect on the ever-
expanding class of pseudo-government employees from Garcetti is that they 
are going to be forced to accept the same free speech limitations related to their 
job function as civil servants, despite the fact that they did not accept actual 
government employment.  Instead, they accepted employment with a 
contractor who entered into a business relationship with the government.  For 
courts, this places them in the ironic, new, permanent, and intrusive position of 
having to pierce the veil not only of the government bureaucracy but also the 
contractor’s corporate structure to determine if and when these individuals are 
speaking pursuant to job duties or merely on a subject matter of employment. 
VI.  GARCETTI PLACES PUBLIC EMPLOYEE’S IN AN UNREASONABLE POSITION 
OF TRYING TO DETERMINE WHEN THEIR SPEECH IS PROTECTED 
For decades, the Supreme Court has recognized “a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
 
 269. See id. at 24.  One woman noted the only thing that distinguishes her from the traditional 
government employees is that the name of the contractor is printed on her ID badge.  Id. 
 270. See id. at 1 (“Spending on federal contracts has soared during the Bush administration, to 
about $400 billion last year from $207 billion in 2000, fueled by the war in Iraq, domestic 
security and Hurricane Katrina, but also by a philosophy that encourages outsourcing almost 
everything government does.”). 
 271. 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996) (“[I]ndependent contractors are protected, and . . . the 
Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as contractor rather than as 
employer, determines the extent of their protection.”). 
 272. See id. at 674. 
 273. See Duran v. City of Corpus Christi, No. C-04-500, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46917 (S.D. 
Tex. July 11, 2006).  While Duran demonstrates how a combined reading of Umbehr and 
Garcetti can be used to deprive an independent contractor of speech made pursuant to a job 
function, this case was subsequently vacated by the Fifth Circuit on alternative grounds.  Duran v. 
City of Corpus Christi, 240 Fed. App’x 639 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”274  
Nothing is more fundamentally important to the principles of democratic self-
government than for the electorate to be well informed on the inner workings 
of its government.275  For that reason, “[s]peech concerning public affairs is 
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”276  Not 
coincidently, government employees are in a “unique position to uncover 
improprieties within the government due to their first hand knowledge of 
governmental operations.”277  For this reason, the Ninth Circuit in its ruling on 
Garcetti recognized that 
[t]he right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public concern is 
important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process, because public 
employees, by virtue of their access to information and experience regarding 
the operations, conduct, and policies of government agencies and officials, are 
positioned uniquely to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern.278 
The Supreme Court, too, has appreciated the major concern with restricting 
public employee speech rights is that their voices will be lost on issues of 
government mismanagement, thus undermining the ability to maintain 
government integrity.279 
Clearly, the most well informed are those individuals that comment on 
issues directly related to their job duties.  The Department of Defense auditor 
is clearly in a better position to comment on misappropriations to a defense 
contractor than the average soldier is.  However, the effect of the new rule is to 
silence these critical voices and undercut the public’s ability to hold the 
government accountable.280  In practical terms, Justice Souter points out that 
the Court’s new rule places beyond First Amendment protection “a public 
auditor [speaking] on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, . . . a 
building inspector [making] an obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, 
or . . . a law enforcement officer [who] expressly balks at a superior’s order to 
 
 274. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 275. See Levinson, supra note 194, at 25. 
 276. Lierly, supra note 2 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). 
 277. Zack, supra note 50, at 895. 
 278. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
 279. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam). 
Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public employees are often 
the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the 
operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the 
public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of 
informed opinions on important public issues.  The interest at stake is as much the public's 
interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 280. Lierly, supra note 2. 
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violate constitutional rights he is sworn to protect.”281  The majority should 
have recognized that the best way to enhance government efficiency is to 
encourage these individuals with the most well-informed views on 
mismanagement and ineffective leadership to come forward and present the 
public with an opportunity to vote out of office those officials who fail to carry 
out their duties effectively.282  Where a government employee can show such a 
compelling interest in their speech, why should that not, on balance, trump the 
interest of his boss in keeping the electorate in the dark about ineffective 
leadership? 
Beyond those that are actually placed outside of First Amendment 
protection because they are speaking pursuant to a job duty, the perception 
generated by this rule will discourage other employees, even those who would 
be protected, from speaking up.  It has been argued that Pickering and Connick 
themselves have already made it difficult for a public employee to understand 
when his speech is protected.283  Garcetti only compounds this bewilderment.  
The Court’s new prong places government employees in the unreasonable 
position of having to determine whether or not their speech will be protected if 
they speak out on matters of governmental mismanagement.  While the Court 
is attempting to promulgate a speech rule for public employees that is the same 
standard as the rule for private employees,284 the de facto effect is to place an 
increased and undue burden on public employees.  While non-government 
employees do have greater restrictions placed on their speech than public 
employees,285 it is also very clear when their speech is employment speech and 
when it is civic speech.  A public employee will have to engage in the same 
“practical inquiry” into their own job description that courts will have to 
undertake in order to determine if they are speaking pursuant to a job duty or 
merely on a subject matter of their employment.286  An employee of a private 
company is not forced to engage in this inquiry. 
While the Court attempts to distinguish the situation faced by the teacher 
in Pickering from the situation faced by Ceballos, government employees 
 
 281. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1966–67 (2006) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 282. See Levinson, supra note 194, at 25. 
 283. See Allred, supra note 46, at 456 (arguing that employees’ lack of understanding of 
Connick will spur litigation). 
 284. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (majority opinion) (“Government 
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ 
words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public 
services.”). 
 285. Only public employees are entitled to the Pickering balancing of their interest in the 
speech versus the government’s interest in efficiency.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968). 
 286. See supra Part IV. 
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themselves will not be able to do so.  Most employees will at best be 
bewildered by Garcetti and at worse see Garcetti as a general restriction on 
free speech and will not be able to judge for themselves whether their situation 
is more closely related to Ceballos or Pickering.  While the inquiry is a 
practical one, nothing precludes a government employer from unreasonably 
expanding a job description to generate the perception that all speech is not 
protected because it is pursuant to a job duty.287  The only way to challenge an 
expansive job description is through yet more litigation.288  As a consequence, 
public employees will be less willing to speak out for fear of reprisal, even in 
situations that they might still have legal protection.  Thus, while public 
employees are the ones most affected by mismanagement or corruption and are 
in a unique position to expose government abuse, they are the people least 
willing or able to discuss these issues.  This unwillingness of public employees 
to speak, even where legally protected, will have a chilling effect on the public 
as a whole.  The general public loses out entirely on the benefit of hearing 
from government employees, presumably the most well-informed members of 
society when it comes to government function, on important issues. 
The other possible consequence from an employee trying to determine if 
they are protected or not in the wake of Garcetti is that they could perceive the 
“doctrinal anomaly” that the Ninth Circuit cites, namely that employees retain 
more protection by going directly to the newspaper than they do going to their 
boss.289  While the Supreme Court agreed that it would be “inconsistent to 
compel public employers to tolerate certain employee speech made publicly 
but not speech made pursuant to an employee’s assigned duties,” the Court 
thought this anomaly to be limited in scope.290  The Court also felt this 
perceived anomaly could encourage government employers to give employees 
an internal forum to discuss concerns.291  However, until employers do this, the 
Ninth Circuit might be correct: a government employee who is worried he or 
she does not have the constitutional protection from retaliation to bring 
instances of misconduct to their supervisor might be better off to “bypass their 
supervisors and take their tales, for profit or otherwise, directly to a scandal 
sheet or to an internet political smut purveyor.”292 
 
 287. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 288. See id. 
 289. Id. at 1961 (majority opinion). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
626 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:589 
VII.  THE SUPREME COURT CREATES A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT BY ARGUING 
THAT WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES ARE SUFFICIENT PROTECTION TO QUELL 
THE POLICY CONCERNS OF LIMITING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The Court in Garcetti attempted to quell some of the public policy 
concerns with limiting a government employee’s ability to raise issues of 
misconduct by saying that government employees have a “powerful network of 
legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor 
codes” to protect them.293  Whistleblowing occurs when an employee, 
employed in any position, notifies a supervisor or governmental agency of 
illegal activity being conducted by his employer, the government agency.294  
Whistleblower statutes have been enacted in some form by the federal 
government and by all fifty states.295  These statutes are intended to allow 
employees to bring forward allegations of government wrongdoing without the 
fear of reprisal.296  However, these statutes sometimes carve out exceptions for 
certain agencies or acts.  For example, the Federal Whistleblower Protection 
Act does not provide protection for employees of the FBI, CIA, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or General Accounting 
Office.297 
Since the 1980s, state law, as opposed to federal regulation, has taken the 
lead in the arena of whistleblower protection.298  As such, while each of the 
states has some type of anti-retaliation provisions on its books, the coverage 
available to whistleblowers varies greatly.299  For example, some states only 
provide whistleblower protection to state employees,300 while others extend the 
 
 293. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1962; see also id. at 1970 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority’s second argument for its disputed limitation of Pickering doctrine is 
that the First Amendment has little or no work to do here owing to an assertedly comprehensive 
complement of state and national statutes protecting government whistle-blowers from vindictive 
bosses.”). 
 294. Laura Simoff, Comment, Confusion and Deterrence: The Problems That Arise From a 
Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for Environmental “Whistleblowers,” 8 DICK. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 325 (1999). 
 295. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower 
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 132–75 app. 1 (2000). 
 296. Simoff, supra note 294, at 326. 
 297. David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes?  Towards a Judicial 
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 121 (1995). 
 298. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 295, at 105. 
 299. See id. at 107–08 (“Important points of divergence include the type of whistleblower 
protected, the appropriate recipient of the report of wrongdoing, the subject of protected 
whistleblowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the quality of evidence of wrongdoing required, 
and the remedies provided to the employee suffering retaliation.”). 
 300. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1970–71 n.9 (2006) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing ALA. CODE § 36-26A-1 et seq. (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
50.5-101 et seq. (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 70A.28 et seq. (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 
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protection to municipal employees as well.301  Furthermore, some states 
require employees to notify their supervisor before they speak,302 while others 
forbid imposing such a requirement.303  Obviously this can cause uneven 
results to the point that an act of whistleblowing that is covered in one 
jurisdiction might not be covered in a neighboring jurisdiction.304  
Furthermore, there often is little judicial consistency in construing these 
multiple statutes as they can be read to varying degree, either very expansively 
or narrowly.305  As Justice Souter recognized, “the combined variants of 
statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not 
a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.”306  Ceballos 
himself was not eligible for whistleblower protection under this patchwork.307 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on such legislative whistleblower laws 
seems to be a dangerous precedent.  “[T]he applicability of a provision of the 
Constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law.”308  In 
effect, the Court is justifying the limitation of a basic Bill of Rights protection 
because it is duplicative of a procedural protection given by the states.  This 
 
(Cum. Supp. 2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.055 (Cum. Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
126-84 (Lexis 2003); 2 OKLA. STAT., tit. 74, § 840-2.5 et seq. (2005 Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 42.40.010 (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-102 (2003)). 
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4113.51 (Lexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
 302. Id. at n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing IDAHO CODE ANN § 6-2104(1)(a) (Lexis 2004); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 833(2) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 149, § 185(c)(1) 
(West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(II) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 
2000); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b(2)(b) (West 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-103(b) (2003)). 
 303. Id. at 1971 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(d)(2) (Cum. 
Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102(1) (West 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.055(2) 
(Cum. Supp. 2004); 2 OKLA. STAT., tit. 74, § 840-2.5(B)(4) (West Supp. 2005); ORE. REV. STAT. 
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 304. Id. at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividuals doing the same sorts of governmental 
jobs and saying the same sorts of things addressed to civic concerns will get different protection 
depending on the local, state, or federal jurisdictions that happened to employ them”); see also 
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 295, at 130; Culp, supra note 297, at 131. 
 305. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 295, at 114–15. 
 306. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1970 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 307. Harris, supra note 257, at 1176: 
As a county employee, Ceballos was not eligible for federal whistleblower protection, but 
he may have relied on California’s whistleblower statute to shield him from retaliation.  
But Ceballos was not eligible for whistleblower protection under the state statute because, 
at the time of his actions, the state law required that the disclosure be made to an external 
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 308. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at _____, 126 S. Ct. at 1970 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of 
County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)). 
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seems backwards.  Whistleblower laws are supposed to provide procedural 
protection for the First Amendment rights that are guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights.309  “Whistleblower statutes do not create a new right to speak about 
governmental wrongdoing; rather, they provide employees who exercised their 
right with additional guarantees against the consequences of doing so.”310  
Thus, legislatures should use whistleblower laws to supplement First 
Amendment protection and encourage more disclosure of government abuse.311 
The First Amendment should provide a floor for the minimum amount of 
protection due to whistleblowers.  Refusing to recognize this and allowing 
states to enact their own statutory scheme provides no assurance that states will 
meet the minimum requirements of the Bill of Rights.  In short, “the mere 
existence of whistleblowing statutes does not negate the need for First 
Amendment protection for public employees carrying out job duties.”312  By so 
concluding that whistleblower statutes are sufficient, the Court is neglecting its 
“responsibility . . . to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental 
rights by virtue of working for the government.”313  Justice Cardozo called 
freedom of speech “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.”314  If the Supreme Court is so willing to restrict this 
fundamental freedom, what is next? 
Finally, there are adverse human effects that relying solely on 
whistleblower statutes can have.  Many employees are afraid to be labeled a 
“whistleblower” out of fear of being “[r]eviled by management and shunned by 
co-workers.”315  Worse, whistleblowers have traditionally had to deal with 
“blackballing” and may have to incur the substantial legal expenses of 
pursuing a retaliation claim, often against a large government agency.316  By 
all practical accounts, such legal action will at minimum require a hearing 
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and defending a 
summary judgment motion.  As a result, it is not surprising that “[m]any 
whistleblowers have lost their homes and marriages as a direct result of their 
concern for the public health and welfare.”317  In fact, one commentator points 
to a study of eighty-four whistleblowers which revealed that “82% experienced 
harassment after blowing the whistle, 60% were fired, 17% lost their homes, 
and 10% admitted to attempted suicide.”318  If nothing else, it seems 
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inconsistent with general notions of fairness not to extend basic constitutional 
protection to those individuals who are willing to risk such adverse effects for 
a greater societal benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must secure the basic liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights 
by ensuring “that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of 
working for the government.”319  Justice Marshall’s decision in Pickering 
recognized this need and was a major victory for those concerned with the 
vitality of lively debate in a democracy.  It ended the era of Holmesian 
rejection of free speech and created a cause of action for government 
employees, providing an opportunity to be heard on issues of public concern 
free from the threat of reprisal.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti 
undermines this advancement and places significant and drastic limits on the 
individual.  While the Court’s desire to maintain the ability of the government 
to function is justifiable, this goal is not effectively achieved with the Garcetti 
rule.  Justice Kennedy’s rule, that when state or federal employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, these employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes and, as such, government employees 
are not insulated from discipline based on their official communications,320 
will not be effective in limiting the number of personal grievances brought as 
constitutional cases.  Rather, the rule breeds confusion because it necessitates a 
“practical inquiry” into every government employees’ job description to 
determine if speech was made pursuant to a job duty or was merely the subject 
matter of her employment.  Any limited benefit that might flow from this rule 
is significantly outweighed by its adverse effects.  The need to engage in this 
“practical inquiry” in each and every employee retaliation claim creates a 
situation ripe for inequities in the courts.  It also undercuts the ability of the 
citizen employee to speak and is detrimental to society as a whole by depriving 
it of these important voices.  Silencing those who are willing to expose 
government abuse is a dangerous precedent that cannot be fixed simply by a 
reliance on the “patchwork” system of state whistleblower laws. 
As such, the Court should move quickly to limit the application of its 
Garcetti decisions.  As Justice Stevens said, the answer to the question of when 
government employee speech should be protected needs to be “Sometimes” 
not “Never.”321  If a court determines that speech was made pursuant to an 
official duty, then this should be strong, but not dispositive evidence, that the 
speech is not protected.  However, rather than this being a threshold issue, a 
 
 319. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 320. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 321. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, _____, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
630 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:589 
court should still weigh the individual’s interest in the speech against the 
disruption caused to the government.  Where such speech is inflammatory or 
misguided surely the individual should not be provided protection.  However, 
when a civil servant, even in the course of his or her job, uncovers information 
of misconduct by the government we must allow him or her to bring it to light.  
The interests of democracy are served by such open and honest assessment.  
Government efficiency in the long run is improved by such honest assessment 
leading to a change in leadership.  Similarly, the interest of justice is served by 
states’ attorneys who work, not for achieving a high conviction rate, but for 
ensuring that only the guilty are convicted.  Mr. Ceballos exposed a police 
officer who lied on an affidavit and a boss who was determined to get a 
conviction nonetheless.  Such courageous action should not lawfully be 
punished with retaliation but rather should be afforded the constitutional 
protection it deserves. 
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